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Peirce on the Continuity between Human and Nonhuman Minds
The Nonhuman Turn: Precursors and Contemporary Protagonists
To dissuade us from our long-cherished conviction that humans are the 
crown of all creation has become the purpose of scholars in philosophy and 
cultural studies who call for a “nonhuman turn.” Under this programmatic 
name, Richard Grusin and the Center for 21st Century Studies announced 
a new paradigm in the humanities on the occasion of a conference at the 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee in 2015. In his introduction to a col-
lection of papers from this meeting, Grusin explains that the project aims at 
decentering human beings from their allegedly privileged place in the cosmic 
design. The twenty-first century’s nonhuman turn, as Grusin sees it, “covers 
a wide variety of recent and current critical, theoretical, and philosophical 
approaches to the humanities and social sciences … engaged in decenter-
ing the human in favor of a turn toward and concern for the nonhuman, 
understood variously in terms of animals, affectivity, bodies, organic and 
geophysical systems, materiality, or technologies” (vii). The cover design of 
the book edited by Grusin presents the fragments of an electronic circuit 
board and incomplete drawings of two insects. It thus reduces the plurality 
of trends under the nonhuman heading to two rather divergent ones, animal 
studies and the study of digital technologies. The visual argument seems 
to be that animals and digital technologies are the two major challenges in 
the current trend of decentering humans towards the nonhuman. Who are 
the protagonists of this trend? The tentative answers offered in the follow-
ing have to remain restricted in their focus to the domain of contemporary 
philosophers who have included animals in their purview, but the scope will 
extend to some precursors of the current turn towards nonhuman animals. 
In 2002, Giorgio Agamben led the way with his reflections on the nature 
of the animal in the human, proposing a philosophy of the nonhuman under 
the title The Open, with the subtitle Man and Animal. With reference to Carl 
Linnaeus’ Systema Naturae of 1735, Agamben expounded how much the 
tradition of humanism had neglected the continuity between the biological 
species of humans and apes (24). For Agamben, the insistent attempts of 
humankind to define itself as a species separate from all other animals is the 
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product of an “anthropological machine” constructing the human species as 
separate from nonhuman ones: 
Homo sapiens, then, is neither a clearly defined species nor a substance; it is, rather, 
a machine or device for producing the recognition of the human…. It is an optical 
machine constructed of a series of mirrors in which man, looking at himself, sees 
his own image always already deformed in the features of an ape. Homo … must 
recognize himself in non-man in order to be human. (26-27)
Derrida followed next in the philosophical turn towards the nonhuman, 
when he addressed the relationship between human and nonhuman animals 
in The Animal that Therefore I Am of 2006 and in The Beast and the Sovereign 1 
and 2. 
Even a philosopher of the nonhuman so far renowned only for contribu-
tions to the philosophy of technology, Gilbert Simondon, became known 
for philosophical reflections on animals. His Two Lessons on Animal and Man, 
originally a manuscript of lectures delivered in the 1960s, were published 
posthumously in 2004 and became translated to English in 2011. That 
Simondon’s ideas on animals could attract attention in the wake of the 
nonhuman turn is somewhat surprising, for the French philosopher sought 
inspiration in the rather anthropocentric doctrine of animal instincts of the 
Stoics, a doctrine quite retrograde from the perspective of modern behavioral 
biology. As Simondon presents it, instinct in animals is “essentially comprised 
of automatism” and “what the animal does that resembles man, it does by 
instinct. Whatever this may be, man does it by reason” (55). 
Despite these outdated anthropocentric premises, Simondon’s Two Lessons 
are still readable because they offer a broad historical panorama of ideas on 
animals, ranging from the Presocratics to the classics of French philosophy. 
They also present remarkable insights on the mechanical side of the nonhu-
man. The antipodes in Simondon’s panorama are Montaigne and Descartes. 
The author characterizes the former as a monist and the latter as a dualist. 
Montaigne “is fundamentally a monist, which is to say, all psychical faculties 
existing in animals are the same as those existing in man. For Montaigne, 
animals judge, compare, reason, and act the same as man; the same and even 
better” (70). These ideas certainly position Montaigne as a philosophical 
precursor to the philosophical turn towards nonhuman animals. 
Simondon’s summary of Descartes’ dualist position is that Cartesian 
animals are creatures without intelligence, instinct, and, of course, without 
a soul. Animals are restricted to the physical sphere of res extensa, where 
they act as machines or automata, whereas humans, endowed with a soul, 
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consist both of res extensa and of res cogitans. Only they are thinking beings. 
To attribute reason to animals is an offense second only to blasphemy, “for 
after the error of those who deny the existence of God …, there is none that 
is more powerful in leading feeble minds astray from the straight path of 
virtue than the supposition that the soul of the brutes is of the same nature 
with our own” (Discourse on M., pt. 5).
Simondon’s panorama of the philosophical ancestors of nonhuman stud-
ies does not include the radical ideas entertained by Julien Offray de La 
Mettrie, which also deserve mention in the context since La Mettrie inverts 
Montaigne’s humanistic perspective on animals by attributing to both ani-
mals and humans a mechanical nature. In his book entitled L’homme machine 
of 1748, La Mettrie provokes his readers with the argument that not only 
animals but also humans are machines, with the only difference, that humans 
are “enlightened machines” (“machines bien éclairées”). 
Evidence for the recent turn away from anthropocentrism also comes 
from the contemporary philosophy of consciousness, the mental state that 
René Descartes emphatically denied to nonhuman animals, when he de-
clared that only a creature endowed with a soul could qualify as a conscious 
being. Michael Tye, a renowned philosopher of consciousness, raises the 
question whether animals are conscious beings. In his recent book Tense 
Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs, he answers this question affirmatively on the 
premise that “a being is conscious just in case it undergoes experience, so 
that the problem of animal experiences is one and the same as the problem 
of consciousness” (xv). Tye is also an advocate of the extension of the scope 
of nonhuman studies from living beings to lifeless creatures. The author not 
only gives evidence of consciousness in biological organisms, including those 
of lesser biological complexity, such as fish, honeybees, crabs, caterpillars, 
protozoa and plants, he also refrains from denying feeling and consciousness 
to complex robots. 
Brian Massumi’s Answers to the Question of What Animals  
Teach Us about Politics 
Under the thought-provoking title, What Animals Teach Us about Politics, Brian 
Massumi’s 2014 book is a philosophical manifesto of twenty-first century 
nonhuman studies. If animals are agents in politics, Massumi’s title can well 
be read as an allusion to the “Parliament of Things” convoked by Bruno 
Latour in 1991 in the last chapter of We Have Never Been Modern, where the 
author formulates a plea for the rights of material objects and for a philoso-
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phy of the nonhuman, acknowledging the agency and even the rights of 
objects. Massumi characterizes his project of rethinking the place of humans 
in the universe by denouncing anthropocentric thought as a symptom of 
human arrogance: 
The hope is that … we might move beyond our anthropomorphism as regards 
ourselves: our image of ourselves as humanly standing apart from other animals; 
our inveterate vanity regarding our assumed species identity, based on the spe-
cious grounds of our sole proprietorship of language, thought, and creativity. (3)
Massumi’s manifesto makes a case for a change of direction towards a world 
in which humans and animals may truly coexist. The author formulates 
his answer to the question of what animals teach us about politics in the 
form of fourteen “propositions” (38-54), condensed into four (M1-M4) in 
the following: 
M1. Reflexive consciousness, language and thought. Animals must no longer be 
studied in terms of animal behavior, a term that smacks of behaviorism 
anyway. Instead, we should turn to the study of “animal thought and 
its distance from or proximity to those capacities over which we human 
animals assert a monopoly and on which we hang our inordinate pride 
in our species being: language and reflexive consciousness” (2). 
M2. Reasoning and creativity. Instinct is not a blind mechanism by which animals 
act quasi-automatically, as even the cofounder of modern ethology Niko 
Tinbergen claimed in his studies of the begging behavior of herring-gull 
chicks of the 1950s and 1960s. Massumi rejects the assumption that 
animals behave according to a logic of inborn necessity and postulates 
instead that they think according to a logic of abduction allowing for 
creativity in the pursuance of their goals. He revealed that Tinbergen, 
ironically, ignored the proximity between animal and human reasoning 
and went so far as to describe the animal as “a machine, albeit one of 
‘great complexity’ …, like a ‘slot machine’” (16). Against Tinbergen’s 
“rigid image of the animal as a mechanism dominated by an automa-
tism,” Massumi argues that “instinctual movements are animated by 
a tendency to surpass given forms … [and] are moved by an impetus 
toward creativity. No efficient cause can be singled out as pushing this 
movement of experience’s self-surpassing from behind” (17). 
M3. The human-animal continuum. Against Tinbergen’s interpretation of ani-
mals as complex machines, Massumi puts forward the argument that 
animals evince “a first degree of mentality in the continuum of nature” (17) 
so that the polarized opposition between humans and animals needs to 
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be abandoned and redefined in terms of a continuum. “Replacing the 
human on the animal continuum … must be done in a way that does 
not erase what is different about the human but respects that difference 
while bringing it to new expression on the continuum: immanent to 
animality” (3).
M4. Logic of mutual inclusion. Massumi pleads for rethinking humans as ani-
mals and for introducing a logic of “mutual inclusion: that of the animal 
and the human,” with the implication that “it is animality and humanity 
as a whole, and in their difference, that have paradoxically entered into 
a zone of indiscernibility” (7). 
How Peirce Anticipated Issues of Contemporary Nonhuman Studies
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), the founder of the philosophy of 
pragmatism, anticipated key concepts of the contemporary turn towards 
nonhuman studies in his philosophy of nature and cognition. The continu-
ity between human thought and nonhuman nature was one of the guid-
ing principles of his evolutionary philosophy, formulated in his doctrine 
of synechism (the dogma of continuity). Key notions of the current turn 
towards nonhuman animals, such as animal consciousness (Tye), selfhood 
(Colapietro; Irvine), creativity and innovation (Kaufman and Kaufman), 
anthropocentrism (Boddice), or animal reasoning (Gould and Gould), are 
recurring topics in his writings. 
The following sections examine four of these issues to show how Peirce 
anticipated Massumi’s four “propositions” M1 to M4. Parallel with Mas-
sumi’s deliberations on reflexive consciousness (M1), the first of these sec-
tions addresses Peirce’s ideas on nonhuman consciousness. The following 
sections on “Animals as Rational Beings,” “The Continuity Between Human 
and Nonhuman Minds,” and “Humans as Animals” present parallels with 
Massumi’s thoughts introduced above under M2, M3, and M4, respectively. 
Peirce on Nonhuman Consciousness
Anticipating Massumi’s premise M1 that nonhuman animals evince reflexive 
consciousness, too, as well as Tye’s philosophy of consciousness in nonhu-
man animals, Peirce defined consciousness and experience as quasi-syno-
nyms when he used the terms “categories of experience” and “categories of 
consciousness” interchangeably (Collected P. §§ 1.377, 7.524). He distinguished 
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three modes of consciousness, the first associated with feeling (Firstness), the 
second with otherness, resistance, action and reaction (Secondness), and the 
third with signs, mediation, and reason (Thirdness). Peirce claimed that all 
of these modalities of conscience could be found, to different degrees, both 
in human and in nonhuman animals. As to the first, consciousness of feel-
ing, Peirce argued that it is even more vivid in animals than it is in humans: 
Consciousness … is rather an ambiguous term. There is that emotion which 
accompanies the reflection that we have animal life. A consciousness which is 
dimmed when animal life is at its ebb, in age or sleep, but which is … more lively 
the better animal a man is, but is not so the better man he is. You can all distinguish 
this sensation I am sure; we attribute it to all animals … because we have reason to 
believe that it depends upon the possession of an animal body. (Collected P. § 7.585) 
What the consciousness of feeling means in human and nonhuman animals 
is the topic of the fragmentary manuscript, “The Ground-Plan of Reason,” 
of 1910 in which Peirce elaborates on the following: 
Beasts and birds, tortoises and toads, and even some fishes … must feel, it would 
seem, if they are living things in a sense resembling in the least degree what any-
body means when he says that he is alive, that is, if he has any inside life,—anything 
in which nobody else and nothing partakes with him. This seems to be precisely 
what we mean by Feeling: it is that which is within some single person and which 
nobody else has anything to do with. (CSP Papers, ms 658: 2-3) 
What can humans know about the consciousness of feeling in animals at all? 
Thomas Nagel addressed this question in his much-quoted paper “What is it 
like to be a bat?” of 1974, and in the context of Nonhuman Studies, Steven 
Shaviro has shed new light on the issue. The question is whether a human 
being can have knowledge about feelings and perceptions of nonhuman 
animals, such as a bat, at all. Since “the bat’s thinking is inaccessible to us, 
we should not anthropomorphize the bat’s experience by modeling it on our 
own. But we also should not claim that, just because it is nonhuman, or not 
like us, the bat cannot have experiences at all” (25-26). 
Peirce’s answer to the question of whether we can know how other 
living beings feel is both no and yes, but also that it makes no difference 
whether the other mind is a human or a nonhuman animal. Since a feeling 
“is something that but one mind can have” (CSP Papers, ms 658: G8), we 
need to recognize that any feeling as such must remain unintelligible. “To 
comprehend it or express it in a general formula is out of the question” 
(Collected P. § 5.49). Nevertheless, it is undeniable that animals do have feel-
ings because the fact that they feel can be inferred from the signs of feeling 
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they give and from the commonsensical assumption that the life of animals 
must evince analogies to the life of humans. Animals “must feel … in a sense 
resembling in the least degree what anybody means when he says that he is 
alive” (CSP Papers, ms 658: 3). 
Animals as Rational Beings: Instinct and Abductive Reasoning 
With his reference to “animal thought” (M2), Massumi takes a stand against 
the doctrine, at the root of Western anthropocentric thought, that only hu-
mans are thinking beings. Aristotle had divulged this doctrine with his con-
cept of the “rational animal” (ζῷον λόγον ἔχον, NE, 1098a3-5) by which he 
defined the nature of humans in contrast to nonhuman animals as nonra-
tional beings. In his Pensées, Pascal had formulated the doctrine that only 
humans, but not animals think in his famous dictum, “Man is but a reed …, 
but he is a thinking reed” (fragm. 348). 
Peirce anticipated Massumi’s plea to recognize that animals are thinking 
beings in many refutations of the denial of reason to animals. Animals not 
only think and have ideas; they also reason, according to Peirce. Against 
the hubris of humans who believe that only they are rational beings, his 
polemical counterargument is the following:
In practical affairs, in matters of vital importance, it is very easy to exaggerate 
the importance of ratiocination. Man is so vain of his power of reason! It seems 
impossible for him to see himself in this respect, as he himself would see himself 
if he could duplicate himself and observe himself with a critical eye. Those whom 
we are so fond of referring to as the “lower animals” reason very little. Now I beg 
you to observe that those beings very rarely commit a mistake, while we—! We 
employ twelve good men and true to decide a question, we lay the facts before 
them with the greatest care, the “perfection of human reason” presides over the 
presentment, they hear, they go out and deliberate, they come to a unanimous 
opinion, and it is generally admitted that the parties to the suit might almost as 
well have tossed up a penny to decide! Such is man’s glory! (Collected P. § 1.626)
In 1898, Peirce referred to the ideas of humans as “quite as miraculous as 
those of the bird, the beaver, and the ant” (§ 5.480), and in an autobiographi-
cal note concerning the rationality of nonhuman animals of 1901, he wrote:
The psychological instructors of my college days used to tell me that when a dog 
is observed to act as if he had reasoned, he was really acting, not from reason, but 
from “the association of ideas.” But more advanced study taught me that that was 
a shocking abuse of a phrase which was invented to mark the greatest discovery 
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ever made in the science of mind, namely, that all the operations of the soul take 
place according to one general formula which applies to reasoning and instinctive 
action alike. . . Then in 1863 came Wundt’s Lectures of the Minds of Men and Brutes, 
which so emphasized the analogy between the dog’s process of thought and that 
of the philosopher, that I, for once, lost sight, for a time, of the distinction my old 
professors had made, a distinction of substantial importance, notwithstanding 
their vicious way of expressing it. Certainly, dogs do, occasionally, really reason. 
(CSP Papers, ms 691)
Peirce attributed the consciousness associated with reason and reasoning 
(his consciousness of Thirdness) and even some form of self-consciousness 
without exception but with due differentiation to all animals. Animals, he ar-
gued in contrast to Descartes, Tinbergen, Simondon, and “the psychological 
instructors of his college days” do not act by blind instinct, but are reason-
ing beings, even endowed with the capacity of modifying their instinctual 
behavior through “self-critical” thought. With reference to research findings 
of behavioral biologists of his time, which showed that animals are able to 
change seemingly inborn habits in order to adapt to environmental changes 
within their lifetime, he argued:
When the minds of the lower animals first began to be studied, it was the un-
changeableness of animals’ methods that led observers to draw a sharp line of 
demarcation between Instinct and Reason. But facts subsequently came to light 
showing that that fixity was only relative, that bees in a clime of perpetual sum-
mer, after some generation give up storing vast quantities of honey; that beavers, 
provided with new material, gradually evolve new styles of architecture; that 
sheep, carried to valleys where poisonous hellebore grows, learn not to eat it; 
that birds sometimes take to unaccustomed food, and come to prefer it…. Such 
phenomena evince an element of self-criticism and therefore of reasoning. (CSP 
Papers, ms 831: 12-13)
When Massumi interprets “animal behavior” as creative (M2), his argu-
ment finds support in such examples, and when he attributes the capacity 
for abductive reasoning to nonhuman animals, he uses a concept coined 
by Peirce. Like induction and deduction, abduction is a mode of reason-
ing. Whereas the former modes are more typical of human reasoning, the 
latter is a characteristic of both human and nonhuman animals. Abduction 
is the instinct of guessing correctly, the intuitive “faculty of divining the 
ways of Nature” (Collected P. § 5.173), but by this method we reason neither 
“blindly” nor mechanically. Abduction is an uncertain hypothetical mode 
of reasoning, which enables us to arrive at truths with a probability higher 
than chance since “although the possible explanations of our facts may be 
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strictly innumerable, yet our mind will be able, in some finite number of 
guesses, to guess the sole true explanation of them” (§ 7.219). In c. 1907, 
Peirce draws the following parallel between abductive reasoning in human 
and nonhuman animals:
Our faculty of guessing corresponds to a bird’s musical and aeronautic powers; 
that is, it is to us, as those are to them, the loftiest of our merely instinctive powers. 
I suppose that if one were sure of being able to discriminate between the intima-
tions of this instinct and the self-flatteries of personal desire, one would always 
trust to the former. For I should not rate high either the wisdom or the courage 
of a fledgling bird, if, when the proper time had come, the little agnostic should 
hesitate long to take his leap from the nest on account of doubts about the theory 
of aerodynamics. (Collected P. § 7.48)
Peirce’s most detailed objection against the view that instinct operates blindly 
in animals can be found in his manuscript “On the Essence of Reasoning and 
its Chief Varieties” of 1911 in which he criticizes the dichotomy of reason 
and instinct as false. It begins with another autobiographical reminiscence:
Some seventy years ago, my beloved and accomplished school-ma’am taught 
me that human kind, being formed in the image of our Maker, were endowed 
with the power of Reasoning, while “the animals,” lacking that power, (which 
might have made them dissatisfied,) received, each kind, certain “instincts” to do 
what was generally necessary for their lives. At least, so I understood her. But 
when I subsequently came to observe the behaviors of several big dogs and little 
birds and two parrots, I gradually came to think quite otherwise. For, in the first 
place, I gradually amassed a body of experiences which convinced me that many 
animals, perhaps all the higher ones, do reason, if by Reasoning be meant any 
mental operation which from the putting together of two believed facts leads to a 
Belief different in substance from either of those two. (CSP Papers, ms 672, II.1-2)
The mode of reasoning in domestic animals that Peirce describes in this 
manuscript is not only the one of abduction (for which there is an example 
in a passage omitted above) but also the one of deduction, that is, the deri-
vation of a conclusion (a new belief) from two premises (“believed facts”).
The Continuity Between Human and Nonhuman Minds
For Peirce, the continuity between human and nonhuman beings is not a 
matter of the continuity between beings with and without minds, but one 
between organisms of less and more complex mental powers. Animals have 
minds, “however strange they be,— such as the medusae, and even down to 
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the very [microscopic organism of the] moner, … each has something like a 
mind with the two fundamental mental powers” of Feeling and Effort (CSP 
Papers, ms 659, G’2-G”3). 
The argument that there is more continuity between human and nonhu-
man animals than discontinuity (M3) pertains to Peirce’s theories of syn-
echism, “the doctrine that all that exists is continuous” (Collected P. § 1.72), 
and the anti-individualism (Oleksy) associated with it. Peirce denounced the 
philosophy of dualism as a method “which performs its analyses with an 
axe, leaving as the ultimate elements, unrelated chunks of being” (§ 7.570). 
Synechism is equally incompatible with individualism. Since “every point 
directly partakes the being of every other, … individualism and falsity are 
one and the same” (§ 5.402, fn.). The very notion of an individual, based 
on the idea of a “separate existence … apart from one’s fellows” deserves to 
be denounced as a manifestation of “ignorance and error” (§ 5.317). Peirce 
rejected it both as an explanatory principle of economic growth and as deter-
minant of biological evolution. As to the former, he criticized the nineteenth 
century conviction “that progress takes place by virtue of every individual’s 
striving for himself with all his might and trampling his neighbor under foot 
whenever he gets a chance to do so” as “the Gospel of Greed” (§ 6.294). 
As to the latter, he rejected Darwin’s principle of the “struggle of life” and 
criticized it sharply: “Among animals, the mere mechanical individualism 
is vastly reinforced as a power making for good by the animal’s ruthless 
greed. As Darwin puts it on his title-page, it is the struggle for existence; 
and he should have added for his motto: Every individual for himself, and 
the Devil take the hindmost!” (§ 6.293). 
Both dualism and individualism are incompatible with the supreme prin-
ciple of evolution that Peirce defined as agapasm (evolutionary love), the final 
cause of evolutionary growth, creativity, and diversity, a universal tendency, 
according to which “advance takes place by virtue of a positive sympathy 
among the created springing from continuity of mind” (§ 6.304).
Minds, for Peirce, are open systems, whose main characteristic is not 
monadic isolation and individuality, but continuity in time and space. There 
is not only continuity between the minds of animals and humans but also 
between the ones of different human beings, insofar as they share feelings, 
experiences, and beliefs, argues Peirce. When two individuals have the same 
thoughts and feelings, they are no longer mutually isolated individuals, but 
minds between which there is continuity (Lane 6). This is why “the vulgarest 
delusion of vanity” is to say, “‘I am altogether myself, and not at all you’” 
(Collected P. § 7.571). Those who claim to have had experiences all of their own 
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commit the error of believing that the signs they interpret are all theirs. After 
all, we are neither the creators of the signs we interpret nor the constructors 
of the reality that our signs represent. Peirce concludes, 
[w]hen we come to study the great principle of continuity …, it will appear that 
individualism and falsity are one and the same…. One man’s experience is noth-
ing, if it stands alone. If he sees what others cannot, we call it hallucination. It is 
not “my” experience, but “our” experience that has to be thought of; and this 
“us” has indefinite possibilities. (Collected P. § 5.402, fn. 2)
The continuity between nonhuman and human animals is Peirce’s topic in 
a manuscript of 1903, titled “The communicability of feelings,” (§ 1.314-16) 
in which the author reflects on the possibility of knowledge about the “emo-
tions of affections” of his domestic animals with the following common-sense 
arguments:
You would never persuade me that my horse and I do not sympathize, or that 
the canary bird that takes such delight in joking with me does not feel with me 
and I with him; and this instinctive confidence of mine that it is so, is to my mind 
evidence that it really is so. My metaphysical friend who asks whether we can ever 
enter into one another’s feelings … might just as well ask me whether I am sure 
that red looked to me yesterday as it does today and that memory is not playing 
me false. (Collected P. § 1.314)
Likewise, it is reasonable to assume that animal perceptions are not funda-
mentally different from human ones. Why should the color perception of a 
bull irritated by a red rag be fundamentally different from the color percep-
tion of a human observer? 
I am confident that a bull and I feel much alike at the sight of a red rag…. I know 
experimentally that sensations do vary slightly even from hour to hour; but in 
the main, the evidence is ample that they are common to all beings whose senses 
are sufficiently developed…. I hear you say: “This smacks too much of an an-
thropomorphic conception.” I reply that every scientific explanation of a natural 
phenomenon is a hypothesis that there is something in nature to which the human 
reason is analogous. (Collected P. § 1.314-16)
In sum, although feeling is accessible only to the one who experiences it, we 
can and must infer by analogy that others, animals and humans, do have 
feelings just as we have. We must recognize that our assumptions about 
the modes of experience and thoughts of others require the same kind of 
inference.
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Humans as Animals 
Forerunners of Massumi’s plea for considering humans as animals and for 
adopting a logic of mutual inclusion (M4) can be found in various of Peirce’s 
comparative analyses of human reasoning and animal instincts. The first is 
implied in the above-quoted argument of 1866 that consciousness of feeling 
is more vital in animals than in humans, which follows from the premise 
that in a human being, this mode of consciousness is “more lively the better 
animal a man is” (Collected P. § 7.585). Human reasoning is superior to the 
reasoning of which animals are capable, but human instincts are less well 
developed since they “are not so detailed and featured as those of the dumb 
animals” (§ 1.638). Reason is superior to instinct insofar as it can be checked 
and controlled by reason itself, but “Reason is inferior to Instinct” insofar as 
“it is less subtle, less ready, less unerring…. There is no such thing as bad 
instinct, unless it be bad in the eyes of something else” (CSP Papers, ms 832, 1).
The second respect in which Peirce anticipates Massumi’s proposition 
M4 is his argument of 1902 that “animal and vegetable instinct … throw 
much light on man’s nature” (§ 1.266), which implies a plea for considering 
humans from the perspective of their nonhuman evolutionary heritage. The 
logic of inclusion behind this argument is the one of abductive reasoning. 
It reveals that “all human knowledge, up to the highest flights of science, is 
but the development of our inborn animal instincts” (§ 2.754). 
The third appears in a number of passages in which Peirce refers to a 
human being in expressions such as “human animal” (§ 4.644) or “some 
person or other animal; in every case, therefore, … an animal” (CSP Papers, 
ms 659, Gʺ10). The definition of human beings (persons) as animals and 
the inclusion of nonhuman beings in the same class is perhaps most explicit 
in a manuscript of 1910:
By a “person,” by the way, I suppose we mean an animal that has command of 
some syntactical language, since we neither call any of the lower animals persons, 
(for though they be able to convey their meanings by various sounds, they do not 
combine different sounds so as to build sentences,) nor do we so call an infant 
that cannot yet put two words together to make a sentence. One might almost 
define a person as an animal possessed of moral self-control; but that would not 
be correct unless we were prepared to call some dogs, horses, parrots, hens, and 
other creatures persons, which I take it nobody does, in spite of the moral respect 
to which they are often well-entitled. One feels that there is an injustice in our 
non-expression of respect for them. Yet after all, the word person, perSonA, has 
explicit reference to speech. (CSP Papers, ms 659: 10-11)
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The Common Root of Humans and Nonhumans in the  
Quasi-Mind of Cosmic Design
For Peirce, human and nonhuman nature have a common root in what he 
defines as mind, thought, or semiosis. What he means is not the mental 
process in, or the actual thought of, an individual, but thought in a sense 
in which it “is more without us than within” and in which “it is we that are 
in thought, rather than thought in any of us” (Collected P. § 8.256). Mind, 
in this sense, manifests itself as the “active power to establish connections 
between different objects, … [the] power of … a living consciousness, such 
[as] the life, the power of growth, of a plant” (§ 6.455). Its prototype is the 
process of semiosis, “semeiosy, or action of a sign” (§ 5.473). Semiosis, in this 
perspective, is a process in which signs grow (Nöth). Thought thus defined 
“appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physi-
cal world,” for “not only is thought in the organic world, but it develops 
there” (§ 4.551). 
Semiosis as a creative agent in nature manifests itself not only inside and 
outside the minds of humans, but even outside the minds of nonhuman 
animals, in plants and in certain respects also in nonorganic nature. Faith-
ful to the doctrine of continuity, Peirce rejects the conception of a semiotic 
universe in opposition to a nonsemiotic one. There are not only signs in 
human minds and culture; signs are omnipresent in all nature. Quite in the 
spirit of synechism, Peirce also reflects on the possibility of sign processes 
outside animal minds, but when he considers rudiments of semiosis outside 
minds proper, he introduces concepts such as “quasi-minds” and “quasi-
signs” § 4.550). A sunflower is his example of a vegetative agent interpreting 
a quasi-sign (here called “representamen”) in a process of quasi-semiosis:
If a sunflower, in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable, 
without further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely 
corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the same reproductive 
power, the sunflower would become a Representamen of the sun. (§ 2.274)
In his most radical tentative definition of the nature of semiosis, in which 
Peirce suggested, “that the entire universe … is perfused with signs, if it 
is not composed exclusively of signs” (§ 5.448, fn. 2), semiosis becomes a 
metaphysical issue. The implication of pansemiotism that it seems to have 
brings Peirce’s ideas close to panpsychism, “very roughly the thesis that 
everything is (or at least some things are) fundamentally physical and fun-
damentally mental” (Chalmers, 21), which is currently being revived in the 
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contexts of object-oriented philosophy (Shaviro) as well as in the philosophy 
of mind and of its extension in the mind’s extension into its environment 
(Chalmers). 
Was Peirce an advocate of panpsychism or at least pansemiotism? The 
question needs to be explored elsewhere in more detail, but two answers 
may be anticipated here. First, Peirce would certainly have objected to the 
term “panpsychism” because his semiotics is not a psychical or psychologi-
cal theory; it is the theory of a logic in a new guise. For him, the universe is 
not permeated with psychical phenomena, but with signs.
Second, Peirce’s semiotics deals with the life of signs, not with dead mat-
ter or with mechanical processes that obey necessary laws. The life of signs 
presupposes semiotic mediation and growth. Neither immutable necessity 
nor precise predictability of things to come belong to the semiotic universe. 
The universe of physical processes has also a potential for growth and crea-
tive evolution. This is what Peirce means with his Schelling-inspired dictum 
that “what we call matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind hide-
bound with habits. It still retains the element of diversification; and in that 
diversification there is life” (§ 6.158).
Conclusion: A Glance at the Other End of the Continuum
Peirce does not fail to address the semiotic capacities that make humans 
unique among all other animals, but he argues that there is hardly any 
 human capacity for which there are no precursors in nonhuman animals. 
The ultimate goal, the summum bonum, namely, “to further the development 
of concrete reasonableness” (§ 5.3), “to make one’s life more reasonable” (§ 
1.602), is a task that can only be promoted by human endeavor, reasoning 
in the sense of “thought subjected to logical self-control,” which, in turn, 
must have “effective ethical self-control” as its regulating agent (§ 5.533). 
Paraphrasing Peirce’s ideas on how humans thus distinguish themselves 
from animals as “rational beings,” Potter writes, “It is this capacity for criti-
cal review and control of actions and of habits of action which for Peirce 
defines reason…. Man is a rational animal whether he likes it or not; … he 
is compelled to make his life more reasonable and in this lies his true dignity 
and liberty” (125).
Self-control is a matter of degree. The lowest degree can be found in 
nature, whereas the highest, including self-control through creative imagina-
tion and ethical principles, are distinctly human. The continuum begins with
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inhibitions and coordinations that entirely escape consciousness. There are, in 
the next place, modes of self-control which seem quite instinctive. Next, there is 
a kind of self-control which results from training. Next, a man can be his own 
training-master and thus control his self-control. When this point is reached much 
or all the training may be conducted in imagination. When a man trains himself, 
thus controlling control, he must have some moral rule in view, however special 
and irrational it may be. But next he may undertake to improve this rule; that 
is, to exercise a control over his control of control. To do this he must have in 
view something higher than an irrational rule. He must have some sort of moral 
principle. This, in turn, may be controlled by reference to an esthetic ideal of what 
is fine. There are certainly more grades than I have enumerated. Perhaps their 
number is indefinite. The brutes are certainly capable of more than one grade of 
control; but it seems to me that our superiority to them is more due to our greater 
number of grades of self-control than it is to our versatility. (Collected P. § 5.533)
What humans and animals have in common is that “the ultimate purpose 
of thought, which must be the purpose of everything, is beyond their com-
prehension,” observes Peirce (§ 5.403, fn. 3). However, humans can and 
do reach out actively in the search for this purpose through self-controlled 
thought, in a way which Peirce paraphrases as follows: “It is by the indefi-
nite replication of self-control upon self-control that the vir [the distinctly 
human] is begotten” (§ 5.403, fn. 3). Furthermore, in their capacity of self-
knowledge, the knowledge of their own identity, humans “far transcend 
the mere animal” (§ 7.591). Despite the incapability of knowing our “own 
essential significance” that we share with all animals, we have “this outreach-
ing identity … [that] is the true and exact expression of the fact of sympathy, 
fellow feeling—together with all unselfish interests—and all that makes us feel 
that he has an absolute worth” (§ 7.591). 
The context of Peirce’s remark, that the ultimate significance of life is 
beyond human understanding, deserves closer attention, not least because 
it contains a quote from a half-line of the 14th stanza of Emerson’s poem of 
1841, The Sphinx. The full context of Peirce’s argument is expressed in the 
sentence, “He cannot know his own essential significance; of his eye it is eye-
beam” (§ 7.591). In the quoted poem, it is the Sphinx who utters the words 
“Of thine eye I am eyebeam,” spoken to the traveler and poet-philosopher 
who dared to address her. To what extent can these words elucidate Peirce’s 
argument? 
The traveler’s eye stands metonymically for his mind, and the eyebeam 
refers to his seeing. The traveler-poet believes to see the object in front of 
him, the Sphinx, but the Sphinx refutes this belief when she pronounces that 
she is this eyebeam herself. By this, she declares that she stands between 
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the traveler’s eye and the object of his presumed vision, which means that 
the traveler cannot really see her. This is why Emerson’s poetic scenario 
can elucidate Peirce’s argument. Just as the traveler-poet cannot actually see 
what he believes to see, humankind cannot know what its ultimate destiny is. 
Although the essential significance, the ultimate meaning, of life is beyond 
human understanding, Peirce attributes to humans the capacity of knowing 
the ethical grounds of their identity. It is “the fact of sympathy, fellow feel-
ing—together with all unselfish interests” which make us feel that life has 
“an absolute worth” (§ 7.591). In this respect, human beings are “conscious 
of their interpretant” (§ 7.591), that is, they are aware of the meaning of 
their existence. The interpretant (or meaning) of the life of a human be-
ing consists in finding again his or her “thought in other minds” (§ 7.591). 
Peirce’s conclusion on these premises concerning the nature of humans is 
“that nothing but an undue ascendency of the animal life can prevent the 
reception of this truth” (§ 7.591).
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